A few hours afterIranian attack on Israel it is possible to make a first preliminary evaluation. How did this situation come about? What has Iran lost and what could it have gained? How do you get out of it?
The attack is the culmination of a months-long escalatory cycle
Iran’s attack is one retaliation in response to a series of operations conducted by Israel starting in December 2023 against senior Iranian officials in Syria, culminating in the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, in which the highest-ranking general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards operating in Syria was killed. These attacks, and especially the one in Damascus, have put Iran in an almost impossible position.
On the one hand he could have take the hit and continue to benefit indirectly from Israel’s growing isolation following the devastation inflicted on Gaza by Israel itself. This would have resulted in a serious weakening of Iran’s deterrence capacity and, in fact, would have represented an invitation to Israel to raise the stakes further. On the other hand, Iran had the option of respond militarilyin an attempt to recover some of the lost deterrencehowever risking being dragged into a war that it does not want and into which the Israeli government would have done everything to bring the United States.
A sort of middle ground was opted for, a massive direct attack from Iranian territory with drones (between 130 and 150) and ballistic and cruise missiles (about 150 in total). It was a attack with great political impact but little practical effect: There were no casualties or significant damage. After all, it was communicated well in advance to give Israel, the United States and their European and Arab allies (UK, France, Jordan in the lead) time to prepare. But did Iran really get what it was looking for?
Strategic defeat or victory for Iran?
On the one hand, Iran has certainly lost us in this whole story. Israel claims to have intercepted almost all of the gifts and missiles and this would have shown the limits of Iranian military power. Furthermore, the fact that the attack was deliberately limited and communicated well in advance clearly indicates that theIran is afraid of a war it cannot sustain.
The attack also saw the participation in the defense of the Israeli territory of Jordanwhich would have highlighted how the real dividing line in the Middle East it is not the one between Arabs and Israelis – as it was until the 1980s – but that between Israel and the Arab countries on one side (with the exception of Syria) and Iran on the other. But most importantly, the attack shifted international focus from Gaza, where Israel is on the defensive, to Iran, where Israel has easily regained American and European support.
Iran has therefore lost some of the advantages it had indirectly gained from the international criticism rained down on Israel for the destruction of Gaza. However, there are some elements that suggest that he may have earned something.
First, it has showed some military capability. It is entirely plausible that the interception rate is lower than the 99% claimed by the Israelis. An attack in the future conducted not for political but for military purposes would in all likelihood have a greater impact than the ‘telegraphed’ one on the night of 13-14 April.
Secondly, the Iran’s reputation in regional public opinion has probably strengthened because he had the audacity to attack Israel despite the risk of a very heavy counter-retaliation from the Israelis and Americans. Considering that the only other regional actors that have affected Israel during Israeli military operations in Gaza are allies of Iran (Hezbollah and Houthis), the credibility of the ‘axis of resistance’ – the network of Iranian allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen – has increased in the region.
Third, the attack put in once more highlighting Western hypocrisy, which promptly condemned (rightly!) Iran, but never admonished Israel for triggering the escalatory spiral. In fact, before the retaliation, the United States and Europe urged Iran not to act, but without doing the same with Israel.
In the end the Iranian attack exposed Western cowardice in the eyes of the global South and of Russia and China: The United States, France and the United Kingdom did not hesitate to use their forces to defend Israel’s airspace and territory from a retaliation that the country itself actually provoked. Yet, they are careful not to take measures to close the airspace of Ukraine, an innocent country attacked by an imperialist power with intentions of conquest – and which also uses the same type of drone.
A way out?
Iran considers the matter over, as its representation at the United Nations said. The US also seems inclined to overcome the incident. President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to “take the victory” of intercepting all or almost all missiles and drones (whether true or not). Above all, he communicated to him that the United States does not intend to participate in an Israeli counter-retaliation. It would not be surprising if the press tip that Biden complained that Netanyahu is doing everything he can to drag the United States into a war in the Middle East was a deliberate move.
The question now is what Israel will do. So far, the Netanyahu government has consistently ignored the requests and warnings of the Americans on Gaza, nor did it feel obliged to warn Washington before the attack on Damascus that triggered the spiral of escalation. Will he continue to attack Iran in such a way as to provoke a second retaliation? If he does so it will be because he will not have received any form of pressure from the Americans and Europeans. Therefore, if in the coming weeks and months we find ourselves in a generalized conflict in the Middle East, the responsibility will also fall on Washington and the Europeans.
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What Iran has lost and what it can gain from retaliating against Israel
“Igit” LLC was fined around 32 million drams for unfair competition by misleading the public
– 2024-04-15 11:02:47
According to the results of the supervision carried out in the field of cheese and cheese products circulation, the Ministry of Education initiated proceedings, within the framework of which it was recorded that
“Igit” limited liability company sold the product with vegetable oil as “Lori” cheese.
The product was sold without a label.
The product was sold without the name, “Contains vegetable oils” information and information about the manufacturing company on its label.
“Igit” LLC organized the sale of the product to commercial networks through an intermediary, individual entrepreneur Avetik Hakobyan, attributing the resulting violations to that individual entrepreneur.
In relation to what was described, “Igit” LLC was fined about 32 million drams by the Commission’s decision No. 504-A of November 28, 2023.
In addition, for submitting unreliable information to the Commission, “Igit” LLC was fined 2 million drams by the Commission’s decision No. 470-A of November 7, 2023, and individual entrepreneur Avetik Hakobyan was fined for unfair competition by misleading the public, unfair competition by causing confusion. and was fined a total of 4 million drams for submitting unreliable information to the Commission by the Commission’s decisions No. 239-A, No. 238-A of May 30, 2023 and No. 469-A of November 7, 2023, respectively.
Alexander Rogers: What will limit the export of fertilizers from Russia
– 2024-04-15 10:02:26
/ world today news/ Recently, the Prime Minister of Russia, Mikhail Mishustin, with the consent of President Vladimir Putin, limited the export of mineral and mixed fertilizers from Russia for half a year (from December 1 to May 1). Some media hastened to write “banned” (and on the stock exchange the shares of Russian fertilizer producers fell by 3-5%), but this is not true.
Just maximum export volumes are limited for nitrogen fertilizers at a level of no more than 5.0 million tons and for mixed fertilizers at no more than 5.35 million tons. For comparison, during the first seven months of the current year, an average of 1.1 million tons were exported per month, that is, 6.6 million tons were obtained in half a year). The reduction compared to the previous period will be just over 10%.
Moreover, all this is agreed with the producers themselves, and the export quotas, as I understand it, will be distributed proportionally in the market between each of them. I have a reasonable suspicion that manufacturers only enjoy such restrictions.
To understand, see the following graph
(GRAPHICS)
First, compared to the previous year, exports in tons fell by much more than 10% (by almost a third). At the same time, secondly, foreign currency earnings have increased significantly (more than one and a half times).
Obviously, this trend will continue with a further decrease in the volume of fertilizer exports. The export price of gas is rising, so European fertilizer producers are either forced to significantly increase the price of the final product, or even temporarily stop and close their production (this is already happening). On this background the deficit of fertilizers will increase, including due to the introduction of the aforementioned quotas, and the price of fertilizers will continue to rise. So is the total revenue.
To produce and transport less, but make more profit is the dream of every producer (“Gazprom” has almost the same joy from the European market now).
Again not so long ago, the European Union introduced sanctions against “Belaruskali”, thereby further reducing the supply of fertilizers on its market. Shooting in the foot is a favorite sport not only of Ukrainians, but also of European officials in Brussels in recent years. It always happens when politics is at odds with economics.
At the same time, domestic Russian gas prices remain at the same level, which means that there is no reason to raise fertilizer prices on the domestic market. And the introduced quotas guarantee that it won’t happen. On the contrary, due to a decrease in the volume of exports in the domestic market, the price may slightly decrease – due to an increase in supply.
Thus, the government solves several problems at once. Not only ensure food security and ensure that the prices of food products grown in Russia do not rise. But it also puts additional pressure on the European market, increasing the deficit and provoking a further rise in fertilizer prices.
That is, either buy Russian gas from Gazprom at a higher price and produce expensive fertilizers yourself, or buy a smaller volume of fertilizers at a higher price. Both options create problems for EU agriculture.
My colleagues and I did a kind of brainstorming and tried to simulate the actions of the Europeans.
Option 1. EU countries agree with each other and the EU centrally allows all its member countries to increase agricultural subsidies. In this case, the problem will be flooded with money (which will go to Russia one way or another). But such a scenario is unlikely, as Europeans have recently failed to reach an agreement on almost any issue, including monetary ones.
Option 2. The countries of the European Union do not agree with each other, but individual countries are beginning to violate common European regulations and subsidize their agriculture themselves. This will create an additional competitive advantage for their manufacturers and cause resistance and protests from others. As a result, tensions and the number of conflicts in the EU will increase.
Option 3. The authorities in Brussels are shouting “We will die, but we will not submit”, and next spring, in addition to energy shortages and financial problems, Europe will be gripped by a food crisis.
We (who thanks to sanctions and import substitution have achieved self-sufficiency in food security and export everything – gas, fertilizers, grain and meat) are happy with all scenarios.
We chew a sandwich, smile and wave.
Postscript: Back in August, I predicted how the development of events in communication with the Europeans would look like.
“-Are you saying that you will not recognize our elections?
– Yes, no! Are you listening, damn oppressors of pregnant Chechen gays!
– Well okay. And gas for 540 dollars for 1000 cubic meters will you buy!
– I will.
And cried.”
The reality turns out to be even more wonderful. And the price of gas is higher, and besides, the deficit has started to creep along the chains.
Translation: V. Sergeev
#Alexander #Rogers #limit #export #fertilizers #Russia
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Alexander Rogers: What will limit the export of fertilizers from Russia – 2024-04-15 10:02:26