Qadri Ahmed Haider
To the soul of the martyr Al-Siddiq / Muhammad Abdul-Malik Al-Mutawakkil.
To him: A veteran politician, and a Yemeni patriotic intellectual who is deeply invested in researching the structure of the Yemeni national culture. A profound cognitive and cultural experience in man and life.. He was always on the side of intellectual modernity, and with the modernization of society, and so was his relationship with his daughters and son, and with everyone around him.. We agreed and disagreed on the details in which Satan resides, and even on some core issues, so he would come out Together, balanced, carrying the torch of the banner of light, dialogue and Yemeni patriotism.
Muhammad Abd al-Malik al-Mutawakkil, a Yemeni intellectual and patriotic politician, whose experience in life taught him the essence of what is beautiful and beneficial to people, and stays on earth.
May his soul have mercy, peace and eternity with the martyrs, the righteous and the righteous.
The Houthi group “Ansar Allah” operates and moves within a trio: politics, ideology (sectarianism), and military “jihadism”, provided that the regulator and engine of this trio is the sectarian ideology (sectarian / dynastic), in their entrenchment and the centering of their own vision, around my idea and my cause of the “Imamate” And “the state,” and they are the central nerve through which they move, manage, and manage their affairs. I mean here they manage what remains of politics, political practice, and what remains in their minds of the image of society as they dream of it as a follower and attached to their own ideology, after the “democratic margin” was abolished And removing the political process from the equation of political and societal action, and imposing a repressive political practice, in which the greatest absentee is democracy, the patriotic republican spirit, and the modern citizenship state. However, the weakest link in the chain of this trio is the political dimension and politics, because politics is the other and direct face of war in their agenda, as its meaning and status are determined by their ideological (sectarian) vision, which they cannot implement or achieve on the ground. Except for the third dimension for them and for them, which is the dimension of “jihad”, in the form of a coup against the intellectual and political history, and against the cultural and national memory of the vast majority of Yemenis. The options here, at the level of the “exodus” dimension of jihad, are open to a different set of partisan/jihadist designations and expressions. (Sunni / Shia), which, no matter how different their names are, in terms of naming them, and the nature of what unites them (Sunni / Shiites), the truth of what unites and unites them is a discourse, and the thought of “jihad” or a coup, to reach “empowerment”, to achieve the goal Whether in the image of the “Islamic state/jihad against the infidels” as it is in the contemporary Sunni jihadist political thought: “Al-Qaeda” “Daesh” “Al-Nusra”, or in imposing the consecration of the “imamate” and “guardianship”, the supreme presidency, as is the thought The “Shiite” jihadi politician, and the expression or concept of “the supreme leadership”, taken from the book “Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniya / Al-Mawardi”, with a difference in the meaning and historical context of each of them: that is, according to both “Sunni” and “Shia” contemporary jihadism.
This is because the Hadawi Imamate, throughout its political history, was not able to produce its own political thought, because political thought needs in addition to various subjective conditions and factors, it needs the presence of political structures, and material, administrative, financial and economic institutions, that regulate the movement of society and power together, which was absent. And total sources, in the political and social history of the Imamate, except in an initial, primitive and limited form within the limits of what establishes and perpetuates the continuity of the rule of the Hadawi Imamate, from Yahya bin Al-Hussein Al-Qasim Al-Rassi, to Abdullah bin Al-Hamza, to the Qasimian authority and its prominent symbol, relying on God Ismael, up to the House of Hamid al-Din (the Mutawakkilite authority), and we all read and heard – and adults remember – how the Hamidian Imamate (the Mutawakkilite) transformed much of what it inherited from urban institutions and modern civil forms from the Ottoman Empire into camps, stables, and private residences, including hospitals, and some service institutions Modern: primary local forms of government, medical buildings, commercial and civil courts, etc., which was a tragic situation that continued until the revolution of September 26, 1926 A.D. Even when the September revolution arose, it found itself facing preliminary tasks to build the state from scratch!!
The first historical miss to walk in the line of development and progress, was with jumping on the vision, call and position of Imam Zaid bin Ali, may God be pleased with him, after he had opened a wide door to the possibility of producing Zaidi political thought, (open to oneself and to the other) by saying: “With the permissibility of an Imamate The preferred with the presence of the best”, and with his advanced intellectual and political position on the concept of “exit”, and with his great positive stance on the two sheikhs “and on the Rightly Guided Caliphate.” Its political thought narrowed down to the limits of the religious leadership, regarding the children of Imam Ali, may God be pleased with him, through Fatima Al-Zahraa, and in Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein specifically, and then in saying that the Imamate is one of the fundamentals of religion, and made it one of the five Mu’tazilite principles or principles, instead of or instead of an origin or principle. status between the two levels”, which is the principle that limits; Rather, it prohibits “taking the perpetrator of a major sin into disbelief,” which is a statement or matter that restricts politically, ideologically, and practically, firstly, the freedom of ijtihad and freedom of belief, and secondly, which narrows the space for the possibility of producing political thought that is open to the other (individual / society / and within a structure). Thought), and the confusion between the religious and political Imamate, and making the issue of governance (authority/state) a legal/religious issue, was one of the most serious reasons and factors for impeding the growth and production of Zaydi political thought, after the Imamate was linked to religion, and made it the monopoly and right of a specific and specific group Of the people, and the suppression and infidelity of those who say otherwise, and most importantly, the movement and the process of ijtihad stopped in the structure of the Zaidi Hadawi thought, and indeed in all Islamic thought – to varying degrees – after the transformation of the Shura, and the caliphate into a “biting king”, with the Umayyad state, “the plight of the creation of the Qur’an.” , and the Abbasids, with an essential difference, which is that the Umayyads, although they were with the idea and issue of “al-jabr” and “political deferment / deferral”, although they did not say that the imama is one of the fundamentals of religion, and that there is a “divine commandment”, but they covered their king. , with a wide spectrum of ideological texts, and religious concepts and speeches that confirm their religious / political right to power, which began to be established with the caliph Othman bin Affan, and this, in our estimation, is one of the reasons for the absence of a “theoretical” political philosophy of the state, – to varying degrees – in thought. Islam in general and in the Zaydi Hadawi political thought in particular throughout their intellectual political history in Yemen, with the exception of some moments of light, renewal and enlightenment with the hardworking scholar Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Wazir, al-Husayn al-Jalal, al-Muqbali, Ibn al-Amir, and Muhammad ibn Ali al-Shawkani, after the Hadawi Imamate unified in all Its political history, with religion, the state, and jihad, and with “political hashemism:”, as a political and practical engine to achieve this, through the principle and condition of “exit”.. It is the same crisis that the Houthi group faces – which has not emerged from the cave of the past that was – in terms of practice Political, political, and religious thought, with a political/historical (cognitive) difference, which is that “Ansar Allah” do this after many centuries, and the human world invades the human universe, affirming the centrality of the human self, ratifying human rights and citizenship rights, and emphasizing more on the role of the individual. / Man, in the making of history, where the voice and the whip of “jihad / exodus” and “levies” rise as a way out of the crisis and to impose the formula of rule / by the “imamate”, as they want and dream of it, after the condition of “exit” was distorted, as one of the conditions of the imama Zaydism, on its objective, subjective, and intellectual historical context, which was announced by Imam Zaid bin Ali, may God be pleased with him, in the face of the Umayyad tyranny, in their transformation of the Shura into a member king, hereditary family, and in this context, I am reminded of the opinion of Professor / Zaid bin Ali Al-Wazir, that the Imam Zaid bin Ali had identified the motives of his revolution against the Umayyads in three reasons: “political injustice (the Umayyad monopoly of power), economic injustice (not distributing money fairly), social injustice (making God’s servants empowered), and the sum of these grievances can be summarized in a sentence One: the loss of justice. Thus, the revolution of Imam Zaid was based on the Islamic rule that he crystallized in the “obligation to revolt” against the oppressor without excommunicating him. And this is the difference between the Zaidis and the Kharijites on the issue of exodus” – the quote from Zaid al-Wazir ended – the book (When drought prevails, the tragedy of sectarianism) Yemeni Heritage and Research Center I (1), 1993 AD, p. 93.
According to that theoretical, intellectual, and historical political framework presented by Professor Zaid Al-Wazir, which is what most historical sources say, including – of course and definitely – the vision of Imam Zaid bin Ali. Producing what Imam Zaid bin Ali resisted and opposed, and Imam Hussein bin Ali and Imam Zaid bin Ali accepted him, but in a new dynasty formula “ethnic superiority”, “the family of the house”, over all components of society (the people), with which the principle and condition of exit turned into A jihad against the other, and for the sake of power and domination, that is, to a state of political autonomy, a special authority, to enable this or that imam to gain power, in the name of jihad “going out” against this caller to the imamate, or even against that muhtasib from the same dynasty, or from outside it, which was what was Throughout the history of political Hadawiyyah, or “political Hashemite,” these words of “jihadism” and “jabbing” are – in our estimation – one of the dimensions of the problem in yesterday and today, all in the name of religion, hence the historicality of the Yemeni problem.
And at this moment of “jihad” with a difference in meaning, and in the practice of implementing the idea of “exit” jihad on the ground, the Houthi group “Ansar Allah” meets with a wide range of cases, and from the political designations “partisanship”, Islamic fundamentalism, “jihadism”, Contemporary, only the direct ideological goal may differ between each of them (Sunni, Shiites), although the means may be very similar, as well as the logic of sectarian / sectarian thinking – to this or that degree – only the difference in the details, but the essence that unites and brings them together is Empowerment of power in the name of “sectarian” religion and jihad, and you will not find significant qualitative differences between them regarding the idea of “empowerment” (Sunni, Shiites) in the Arab region.