SUPERBONUS 110% / The good idea that is turning into a flop

The idea of ​​restarting the construction sector with the combination of public tenders for new infrastructures and the increase in deductions for the renovation of residential buildings to improve energy saving and seismic safety of homes had been welcomed by all political forces and public opinion. In addition to the need to modernize infrastructures and improve the environmental quality of buildings, the construction sectors have historically generated an important positive carry-over effect on all economic activities. A factor that has been neglected in the last decade and which, according to a study by the Bank of Italy, has motivated a significant part of the negative gap in Italian growth compared to the average of the EU countries.

However, since the first decree over a year ago by the Conte-2 Government, to launch the superbonus, which introduced 110% deductions for expenses related to the renovation of residential buildings aimed at improving energy saving (eco-bonus) and seismic resistance (earthquake bonus) numerous experts in the sector had in evidence the amount of incongruities of the provision destined to compromise the stated objectives.

The first incongruity is linked to the evident disproportion of the deduction, 110% of the expenditure incurred, which values ​​private assets with a cost borne by the State higher than the expenditure, destined to nullify the positive conflict of interest between customers and suppliers of previous deductions, from 50% to 65% of the expenditure incurred up to a ceiling of 96 thousand euros, with the aim of bringing out the mass of undeclared work that continues to represent a historical scourge of the construction sector.

The practical result was to effectively incentivize the interest of customers and suppliers to charge the State with the maximum possible costs, at the same time forcing the institutions to introduce an abnormal amount of obligations for customers in terms of price lists. reference for the products to be used, cost ceilings per square meter and for the volumes of individual interventions, the need to swear and certify the performance by professionals before, during, and after the planned works. The positive decision to be able to transfer the tax credit to the banks in exchange for the advance of payments and the retention of a share equal to 10% of the benefits involved in parallel a further production of documents aimed at securing the banks. credit from any default.

All this to establish the responsibility for any non-fulfillment or false declarations exclusively on the part of the clients, with the outline of threats, sanctions and penalties of various kinds against them, except to grant them the opportunity to retaliate at a later stage with the certifiers. , designers or suppliers.

All these requirements, in terms of design, brokerage, certification and price increase costs, and the exclusion of certain types of expenses, have effectively reduced the actual value of the customer’s savings from 110% to just over 70%. A figure slightly higher than the benefits of the previous deductions, but with an increase in terms of burdens for the State, bureaucratic obligations, administrative delays, rising prices of products and supplies (in some cases up to 100% or such as to prevent the continuation of construction sites), nullifying a proven and effective historical method for managing the planned tax deductions.

More than a year after the first decree, there are less than 15,000 projects authorized for the use of the superbonus (including about 1,400 regarding condominiums) for a cost commitment of just over 2 billion euros, a quarter compared to the original forecast. The issue of how to simplify the intervention model remains the main object of the legislator’s attention, but in the meantime the expectation of being able to restructure the assets by putting the entire cost in the hump to the State has triggered the expectations of hoteliers, traders, professionals, to be able to expand the scope of the superbonus intervention for a longer time and for non-residential real estate types. At the same time, many clients, especially those interested in interventions of less than 100 thousand euros, have given up the possibility of using them, preferring the old deductions as an alternative.

The way in which the superbonus was conceived and implemented represents in an exemplary way the drift of our ruling class and what we can expect for the management of the 220 billion euros of the Next generation Eu program. Unfortunately not the only and, probably, not even the last.

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